

WALES. UNDEVELOPMENT. AND THE WORLD SYSTEM

by SAM PARRY



To be Welsh is to be born with a duality inside your heart: to be proud of your rich, folkloric traditions while simultaneously being angered at the constant incantation of a story whose day has passed. To be disheartened at the economic position of Wales's working class yet filled with hope that this grievance can be rectified. One of our most famous sons, RS Thomas, embodies this duality in his poetry.



To be angered by the unrelenting fetishisation of our past:

*There is no present in Wales,
And no future;*

*There is only the past,
Brittle with relics,
Wind-bitten towers and castles
With sham ghosts;
Mouldering quarries and mines;
And an impotent people,
Sick with inbreeding,
Worrying the carcase of an old song.*

Yet believing we can improve our lot:
*We were a people wasting ourselves
In fruitless battles for our masters,
In lands to which we had no claim,
With men for whom we felt no hatred.*

We were a people, and are so yet.

*When we have finished quarrelling for
crumbs*

*Under the table, or gnawing the bones
Of a dead culture, we will arise
And greet each other in a new dawn.*

This duality is a microcosm of Wales's history and its national narrative. Our history - as with the history of all nations - is filled with contradictions. Using Wales's role in the Industrial Revolution as an example, this pattern emerges clearly. John Davies, in his *A History of Wales* (2007), states that "there was no place outside of Russia where the Revolution [of 1917] has caused greater joy than in Merthyr Tydfil." Yet, Gwyn Alf Williams (1991), in his contradictorily named chapter "An Imperial Democracy" describes Wales between 1915-1921 as thus:

"BUT THIS WAS NOT simply a matter of coal export, huge though that was, of John Cory's bunkers straddling the world and south Wales coal keeping the greatest navy in the world afloat, staggering though these were. The capital, the technology, the enterprise, the skill and the labour of south Wales fertilised large and distant tracts of the world, from Montana and Pennsylvania to Chile, Argentina and Russia.

They helped to deflect the economic development of Spain, wrenching the centre of its heavy industry from its natural base in the Asturias to the region of Bilbao, where Dowlais planted a subsidiary to snatch the high-grade ores and an even higher-grade people, to scatter Spaniards around its own town and out to Abercraf. South Wales firms bought up shipping companies and port capital in Rouen, Le Havre, Brest, Hamburg, Marseille, Naples; for years Italy's economic rhythms were those of its Welsh coal imports; the little town of Bardi near Parma, with a few friends, specialised in colonising Wales with their popular restaurants, cafes and chip-shops, supplying some of Wales's most striking dynasties and finding an immortality in Gwyn Thomas's novels. For years, the real economic capital of Chile was Swansea, luxuriating in its nitrate clippers and Cape Horners, though it was North Wales which rivalled the Jacks to provide some of their most ruthless oligarchs to both Chile and Colombia."

Wales, therefore, can be seen as proletarian, yet imperialist, proudly Welsh yet a vital cog in the British Empire; a nation whose view of itself is contorted due to straddling these two worlds. It seems eerily fitting that it was a London Welshman, John Dee, that coined the term "British Empire" in 1577.¹

Yet this duality and its role in explaining Wales's relative economic position today is overlooked. Either for simplicity or political traction, many historians

and politicians have decided to concentrate on one side of Wales' Janus-faced past. On one hand, Adam Price, leader of Plaid Cymru, named his book *Wales - The First and Final Colony* which, in essence, paints the support for the Empire and imperialism abroad as a form of false consciousness. In his words, "English imperialism can perhaps be described as Wales's greatest and most terrible export." Michael Hechter, an American sociologist,

described the Celtic Fringe as "Internal Colonies" of England, with his work placing Wales' ills solely at the door of the British state and England. On the other hand, in *Wales - A Question for History* (1999), labour historian Dai Smith fails to truly take into account the interplay between the economy, geography and culture in shaping differences between England and Wales. Understanding that the primary contradictions of society stem from the

economic base is different from the class reductionism which has blighted some Marxist Welsh historians and politicians.

There is a reason that a duality exists in Wales; by looking, defining, and understanding the relations between the contradictions in Welsh society and history, we are more likely to be able to understand Wales's relative economic position. Wales is poor relative to England, but rich relative to most of the rest of the world. It is by looking dialectically at this relationship that we will be better able to navigate the contours of Welsh society both today and in the past.

Wales: A Colony?

Let us begin by defining a colony. According to Paul Reinsh:

A colony is a possession of some national state situated at a certain distance from it, which is ruled by a government subordinated to the metropolis. A colony may

*be inhabited by citizens of the metropolis or by their progeny, or its population may, in its preponderant number, belong to another race. But in any case, the government of the colony must in one way or another recognize its subordination to the metropolis.*²

Colonialism, therefore, is not a new phenomena; we may describe the ancient societies of Greece and Rome, of the Persian Empire, even the Normans and Danes in Britain as colonial. We can, by this definition, map a specific period in time whereby the relationship between Wales and England could be called 'colonial' that runs from roughly 1283 - 1536, after the death of *Llywelyn ap Gruffydd* (popularised as Llywelyn the Great, or Llywelyn the Last). As Williams (1991) explains:

In 1283 Llywelyn was killed after a battle in south Wales; his head duly adorned the Tower [of London]. Independent Gwynedd was obliterated and Edward took pains to secure all insignia and any other symbols which might service a revival, to take

action against the poets and to wipe out whatever trace of a Welsh state remained.

With the fall of Llywelyn ap Gruffydd an epoch ended, the Wales of the Princes. The Welsh passed under the nakedly colonial rule of an even more arrogant, and self-consciously alien, imperialism.

Without attempting to belittle the struggles many in Wales would have faced during this period, it is clear that placing too strong an emphasis on this epoch and of transposing current notions of imperialism and colonialism backwards is not helpful in explaining Wales's economic position nor its relation to other countries. Firstly, is it even possible to speak of a 'Wales' in this period if, indeed "a nation is not merely a historical category but a historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism. The process of elimination of feudalism and development of capitalism is at the same time a process of the constitution of people into nations."³ It may be possible to think of

the Welsh as ‘a people’ but not as ‘a nation’ in this period. This material fact clearly affects our understanding of colonialism. Following from this point, one must understand that material conditions and the economic base differ in one epoch to another, and that from that economic base social conditions develop. In essence, one cannot compare the colonialism of feudal societies nor slave societies (such as ancient Greece and Rome) to the colonialism found under capitalism. In the words of Lenin in *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (2010):

Colonial policy and imperialism existed before the latest stage of capitalism, and even before capitalism. Rome, founded on slavery, pursued a colonial policy and practised imperialism. But “general” disquisitions on imperialism, which ignore, or put into the background, the fundamental difference between socio-economic formations, inevitably turn into the most vapid banality or bragging, like the

comparison: “Greater Rome and Greater Britain.”

Comparing the colonialism Wales endured in this period, to colonialism under capitalism, is to fundamentally overlook the importance of the productive forces in society, to not see that “the mode of production of material values... is the chief force in the complex conditions of material life of society which determines the physiognomy of society, the character of the social system, [and] the development of society from one system to another.”⁴

At the advent of the mercantilist system - the first, primitive, form of capitalism in the mid-sixteenth century - Wales could no longer be called a colony. The 1536 and 1542 Acts of Union between England and Wales annexed Wales into England, thus granting Welsh people the same political and economic rights as their neighbours, while understanding that the Welsh didn’t have the same cultural rights. This unequal relationship

would inevitably lead to inequalities between Wales and England (as we will see later) but, during the period of modern colonial expansion, Wales was much more a beneficiary and active participant than a subject of that colonialism.

The technological developments that helped the rise of mercantilism also led to the period of modern European colonialism. The effects of those thrusts into the Americas, Asia and Africa are still felt today. As Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) describe:

Among the areas colonized by European powers during the past 500 years, those that were relatively rich in 1500 are now relatively poor. Given the crude nature of the proxies for prosperity 500 years ago, some degree of caution is required, but the broad patterns in the data seem uncontroversial.

Civilizations in Meso-America, the Andes, India, and Southeast Asia were richer than those located in North America, Australia, New Zealand, or the southern cone of Latin

America. The intervention of Europe reversed this pattern. This is a first-order fact, both for understanding economic and political development over the past 500 years, and for evaluating various theories of long-run development.

Internal Colonialism

If Wales cannot be considered a traditional colony in its current, everyday sense in the modern period, can it be described as an “internal colony” as argued by, amongst others, Michael Hechter (1975)? Firstly, we must define the characteristics of an internal colony. One of the earliest, most rigorous and most concise definitions of internal colonialism was given by Pablo Gonzalez-Casanova:

Internal colonialism corresponds to a structure of social relations based on domination and exploitation among culturally heterogeneous, distinct groups ... It is the result of an encounter between two

races, cultures, or civilizations, whose genesis and evolution occurred without any mutual contact up to one specific moment The colonial structure and internal colonialism are distinguished from the class structure since colonialism is not only a relation of exploitation of the workers by the owners of raw materials or of production and their collaborators, but also a relation of domination and exploitation of a total population (with its distinct classes, proprietors, workers) by another population which also has distinct classes (proprietors and workers).⁵

By this definition, it is clear that Wales cannot be considered an internal colony. Firstly, how do we gauge when Welsh people and English people firstly came into contact if defining when Wales and England became nations is itself an almost impossible task? Llywelyn ap Gruffydd, for example, popularised as the last Prince of Wales was in fact only the ruler of independent Gwynedd - a region of Wales - and not of Wales in its entirety.

How do we define the intractable “distinctiveness” of Wales compared to England? Furthermore, there has been no colonial structure that is “distinguished from the class structure” for almost 500 years. By Casanova’s definition, the most textbook cases of internal colonialism would include Amerindians in the Americas, especially on reservations; non-white people in apartheid South Africa; Palestinians in occupied Palestine; African Americans before the end of ‘legal’ discrimination enshrined by Plessy v. Ferguson and indigenous Siberians in Tsarist Russia. This is not an exhaustive list, though it paints a clear picture of the types of scenarios that can be considered thus. It should also show that to include Wales within this definition is to make situations of real colonial suffering seem more banal and reduces the theory to an all-inclusive catchphrase.

David Walls (1978) describes succinctly how the definition of internal colonialism has been

stretched so far that it has lost its political salience:

Through conceptual confusion or carelessness, internal colonialism has been used to designate situations of stratification by class, race, ethnicity, or geography, alone or in various combinations. It is also used to describe absentee industrial ownership, although this is a characteristic feature of uneven and polarized capitalist development. Included among such internal colonies have been the U.S. South, northern New England, the northern Great Lakes region, the Southwest, the "Celtic periphery" of England, southern Italy and so on. One explanation may be that the vocabulary of colonization IS more comfortable than that of class conflict, and regional or ethnic chauvinism is more acceptable than talk of socialism.



Michael Hechter and the 'Celtic Fringe'

The notion that Wales, (Scotland and Ireland) are internal colonies of England was popularised by Michael Hechter in his book *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development* (1975). Leaving aside the semantic issues implicit in describing Wales as an internal colony, it is worth briefly discussing some of the theoretical deficiencies of this approach. To quote a passage at some length (emphasis added):

Economic dependence is reinforced through juridical, political, and military measures. There is a relative lack of services, lower standard of living and higher level of frustration, measured by such indicators as alcoholism, among members of the peripheral group. There is national discrimination on the basis of language, religion or other cultural forms. Thus the aggregate

economic differences between core and periphery are causally linked to their cultural differences.

In this description national development has less to do with automatic social structural or economic processes, and more with the exercise of control over government policies concerning the allocation of resources. Since increased contact between core and periphery does not tend to narrow the economic gap between the groups, national development will best be served by strengthening the political power of the peripheral group so that it may change the distribution of resources to its greater advantage. ... The obstacle to national development suggested by the internal colonial model analogy, therefore, related not to a failure of peripheral integration with the core but to a malintegration established on terms increasingly regarded as unjust and illegitimate.⁶

From this passage alone, some theoretical issues begin to emerge. Firstly, there is an assumption that the relative economic underdevelopment of



Wales is due to conscious political decisions stemming from the metropole to intentionally underdevelop Wales. The political decisions that were undertaken did indeed lead to a higher level of relative underdevelopment in Wales, but this is due to the wedding of the state to neoliberalism and capitalist orthodoxy. In other words, the messianic acclaim in which British governments of all parties hold the 'logic' of the market meant that Wales - and areas like it - with a propensity towards heavy industry would be

sacrificed at the altar. However, this same story emerges for all post-industrial communities in the United Kingdom. These policies were not followed to intentionally underdevelop Wales, rather they were followed to underdevelop traditional working class areas regardless of nationality.

Secondly, the model presupposes unequal exchange between the core and the periphery "since increased contact...does not tend to narrow the economic gap between the groups." Yet, John Levering and Lovering

(1978) argues that "unequal exchange is incompatible with the homogeneity of labour and commodity markets." In essence, due to collective bargaining at a UK-level on the one hand, and almost identical prices for goods on the other, there is no space for unequal exchange. The average wage in Wales is 91% of the UK average⁷; comparatively underdeveloped, but not colonial. For unequal exchange to truly exist, the relationship between Wales and England would have to be more similar to Casanova's definition

above; there would have to be “a relation of domination and exploitation of a total population (with its distinct classes, proprietors, workers) by another population which also has distinct classes (proprietors and workers)” which does not exist.

Thirdly, the theory of internal colonialism assumes that the relationship between core and periphery is extractive and oppressive, with a clear movement of resources from periphery to core. Yet, in absolute terms, Wales is a net beneficiary of redistributive measures from the state.

The general usefulness, however, of such receipts is questionable, as Cooke (1982) argues:

However, Wales' debt funding is peculiarly distributed in that a greater proportion goes towards the maintenance of her reserves of labour than elsewhere, while considerably less is spent in the sector which has traditionally been thought of as the key regulator of unemployment under demand-management economic policy, the construction sector.

One deduction to be made from theory here, is that this budgetary distortion is incurred in the course of maintaining surplus labour power which has become 'marginalized' from the productive workforce, but represents a potential source of labour supply ready to be re-attached to the labour force as and when inward investment, as distinct from self-centred accumulation occurs.

This is an exploitative relationship, but that is to be expected from the state in capitalist society. In the words of James Connolly, “governments in capitalist society are but committees of the rich to manage the

affairs of the capitalist class”. The passage above strongly suggests that Wales should concentrate on endogenous growth as currently the core of Britain benefits from Wales’s relative underdevelopment. Higher state transfers in the form of unemployment benefits are seen as a necessary ‘trade-off’ to bind Wales closer to the British State. There is no reason to believe that this is due to an innate hatred of Welshness, yet it is a clear example of a tool the state can use to entrench differences and inequalities. The state in capitalist society needs a working class to be exploited: a rising tide does not lift all boats. In this sense, the experience of the north-east of England is relatively analogous, with higher state transfers in the case of unemployment benefits but a severe lack of state transfers in the form of infrastructure investment. The planned high-speed railway, HS2, for example, designed to help create an economic ‘Northern Powerhouse’, is only designed to go as far as Leeds and will not be

completed until 2040. Newcastle, Middlesbrough and Sunderland - some of the most deprived areas of the UK - are all roughly 100 miles further north.

Furthermore, Hechter discusses “national discrimination on the basis of language, religion or other cultural forms”. Firstly, this further blurs the lines of what constitutes a nation. In Hechter’s work, Page (1978) finds there is “an implicit assumption that some form of national self-consciousness existed from the sixteenth century. This is dubious since scholars would date the birth of nationalism much later and also in view of the fact that at least in the Scottish case no such “ethnic identification” can be said to have existed until very much later”. Secondly, this obfuscates the relationship between the British state and Welsh culture. As far back as the reign of Elizabeth I, the Bible was translated into Welsh, allowing cultural and linguistic differences between England and Wales.⁸ Further, the first legislation passed pertaining specifically to Wales in Westminster for

almost 300 years was the ‘Sunday Closing (Wales) Act’ of 1881, which required the closure of all pubs in Wales on Sundays. This was supported by nonconformist Protestants - the major religion in Wales - as well as vast swathes of the working class.⁹ With regards to the Welsh language, Margaret Thatcher, no less, under pressure from Welsh-language campaigners, created a Welsh-language TV channel, and today it could be argued that Welsh speakers are overrepresented in high-paying public-sector¹⁰ vocations in Wales. This is not to say that the British state has been benevolent, nor positive towards Welsh language and culture. Its position could be best described as neglectful, disinterested and, on occasion, disdainful. Yet, this clearly differs from “national discrimination”. A lack of policies *in favour of* the Welsh language differs from policies *antagonistic to* the Welsh language.

The final point worth considering is the British Empire. How can a colony - or an internal colony - take part in the process of

colonisation itself? A colony will of course have a comprador class which exploits its own people at the behest of a foreign government (Nkrumah, 2004). Yet it is clear that more than a comprador class existed in Wales. Wales was also part of “The West” Fanon describes in *The Wretched of the Earth* (1968):

The West saw itself as a spiritual adventure. It is in the name of the spirit, in the name of the spirit of Europe, that Europe has made her encroachments, that she has justified her crimes and legitimized the slavery in which she holds four-fifths of humanity.

Once again, Wales’s Janus-face came to the fore:

In the early twentieth century Welsh newspapers and magazines, some of them edited by members of parliament, celebrated the role of the Welsh in the Empire, with titles like ‘The Place of Wales in the Empire’ and ‘The Welsh: A Neglected Imperial Asset’. It has been demonstrated that in this period, the Welsh were anxious about the potential for marginalisation. By stressing their significance

in the British Empire they, at one and the same time, positioned themselves within the central endeavour of the British state while also stressing their separate cultural and ethnic identity. Moreover, involvement in the empire and the reciprocal influences on the Welsh churches, press and publications were supposed to help in the transformation of the Welsh into a literate and educated society.¹¹

Towards a New Theoretical Framework

Considering the deficiencies in the approaches above, do we therefore need to create a new framework and theoretical toolkit? As argued by Jones (2015),

There is a need for us to revise the toolkit of regional analysis, but we do not need to invent a wholly new set of tools. We simply need to first understand that the structure and functioning of places cannot be understood without recourse to their very long term political and

economic (and by extension demographic and ecological) history and further that our understanding of their prospects might be enhanced by their placing (conceptually) in a ‘world system’.

This is the cornerstone of the malaise in which Welsh economic life finds itself. Through our obsession with defining ourselves as being either *different to* or *part of* the UK, we miss that Wales - and places like Wales - play an important function in the world capitalist economy or world system, and instead concentrate solely on the relationship *between* Wales and England. Immanuel Wallerstein (2011) argues that “neither the development nor underdevelopment of any specific territorial unit can be analysed or interpreted without fitting it into the cyclical rhythms and secular trends of the world economy as a whole”. Yet this is the exact juncture in which mainstream Welsh economic analysis finds itself in; we must change our analysis to include not only our relationship with England, but with Europe, and the rest of the world.

Wallerstein (2011) helped popularise the notion of a world system, described as

[A] social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remold it to its advantage. It has the characteristics of an organism, in that it has a life-span over which its characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in others. One can define its structures as being at different times strong or weak in terms of the internal logic of its functioning.

Since the sixteenth century the world system has been based on the capitalist mode of production, which “as an economic model is based on the fact that the economic factors operate within an arena larger than that which any political entity can totally control. This gives capitalists a freedom of maneuver that is structurally based. It has made possible the constant economic expansion of the world-system, albeit a very skewed distribution of its

rewards.”¹²

Due to the “skewed” nature of the rewards of capitalism, a global division of labour of core, peripheral and semi-peripheral countries arises. The core countries constitute the Anglophone world, Japan and western Europe; semi-peripheral countries are the BRICS countries, Mexico, Iran and Argentina - countries that have historically had regional, rather than global, influence. The rest of humanity is made up of peripheral countries. The strength of world-systems theory is its ability to explain that peripheral and semi-peripheral countries are not simply catching-up with core countries. Instead, the very existence of core countries hinders the growth of these countries due to capitalism’s uneven spread. As Samir Amin (1979) explains:

In the imperialist period the door to the establishment of new capitalist centres is henceforth closed, while the era of the stages of the socialist revolution is opened ... complete, autonomous capitalism is impossible in the periphery. The socialist

break is objectively necessary there ... In order for the productive forces in the periphery to develop the imperialist system must be broken up, since the contemporary imperialist system is a system of centralization of the surplus on the world scale..., characterized by the acceleration of accumulation and by the development of the productive forces in the centre of the system, while in the periphery these latter are held back and deformed.

My contention is that we can use this theory to help explain the position of countries like Wales - that *within* some core-states - there exist regions that can play the role of semi-peripheral countries. Most of these areas still possess strong cultural differences from the core that are both explained by the unequal development of capitalism in the core-states as well as concurrently being used as a justification for their relative underdevelopment. Examples of peripheral areas within core states may include the *Mezzogiorno* (Italy), Corsica (France) and Wales (United Kingdom).

My contention is that peripheral areas in core states share many of the same characteristics of semi-peripheral states within the world system.

What are the characteristics of a semi-peripheral state?

Wallerstein (2011) argues that “they are collection points of vital skills that are often poetically unpopular” and help to deflect political pressures.

Furthermore, it has been argued that they ensure that wages do not rise too fast in the core, as they can be used for capital investment if highly-organised labour forces demand wages which

would be deemed ‘too high’ by capitalist interests.¹³

Seers (1980) attempts to map this notion of dependency and semi-peripherality specifically in the European context:

Does a country on the ‘periphery’ gain from belonging to a system, the ‘core’ of which consists of countries technically more advanced? It may do so in the narrow sense that its income is likely to be higher than it would otherwise be, but at the cost of structural dependence; proximity brings dangers of subjection

to economic, military and cultural hegemony.

Places such as Wales, the *Mezzogiorno* and Corsica share many of these characteristics and experiences: the Anglicization of Wales, the Francophication of Corsica and the ‘standardisation’ of Italian in the *Mezzogiorno*. They are all similarly structurally dependent on the more highly developed regions of the core state.

Not only is the European core more highly developed and is the beneficiary of higher wages, Seers (1979) argues

there is a spatial, or geographic, dimension. Described as an “incomplete egg”, with the centre in western Germany, the “yolk” could be defined as “Denmark, western Germany, the Benelux countries, Paris, the Lyon area, Switzerland and Lombardy”. The core in its entirety, however, stretches as far as England (not including Cornwall) and Edinburgh to the west; the more heavily populated areas of Norway, Sweden and Finland to the north; northern Italy to the south and *Catalunya* and the



Basque Country to the south-west.

This spatial dimension is inherently of a crude nature, but it includes many interesting findings. Firstly, many of the regions outside the core are generally culturally distinct (to a greater or lesser extent) from the parts of their states that make up the core whether that be Cornwall, Wales, the *Mezzogiorno*, Scotland outside of Edinburgh, Corsica or the areas of Scandinavia where the Sami live. It also helps to explain the relatively different trajectory in Spain, whereby the spatial axis is more important than the cultural axis, considering the differences between *Catalunya*, the Basque Country and Andalusia. Many of these ‘peripheral’ areas also share many of the same characteristics: a dependence on tourism, a concentration of agriculture and the production of primary resources, higher unemployment, a larger reserve army of labour, migration (which, in the case of southern Italy, was deemed a positive by the OECD)¹⁴ and generally

lower wages.

This analysis also asks questions about the role of international institutions, especially in this case, the EU. These areas offer a large reserve army of labour for the core¹⁵ which in effect allows capitalists to dampen wages in the core while simultaneously moving more labour-intensive jobs to the periphery. Since the creation of the euro in 1999, many countries have lost important policy levers such as the ability to devalue their currency. Seers (1979) suggested that “the loss of these policy instruments is potentially costly for countries with chronic payment problems. ... EEC membership might lock a country into dependence on exporting labour. Moreover, it would involve increased reliance on European Transnational Corporations, with the associated problems” that come with that. This is almost prophetic of the situation that peripheral European countries have found themselves in since the financial crisis. The expansion of the EU has in effect created a larger European periphery which

has created a larger reserve army of labour and ensuring that wages do not rise too quickly in the core.

Conclusion

It is not possible to answer all questions regarding the economic dependency of the European periphery in general, and Wales in particular, here. What is possible, however, is to attempt to shift the parameters we currently use in trying to explain their positions. The use of dependency theories developed in Latin America is not an attempt to compare the struggles of peripheral Europe to peripheral countries in general. It is an acceptance that neoclassical economics developed in and for developed regions, which takes for granted their structural characteristics and interest in ‘free trade’, does not work for anyone outside of a very specific “yolk” of countries. It is clear that for the betterment of societies generally we can no longer play a part in a system where the most powerful are the judge, jury and executioner.

Closer to home, it also has specific policy implications for Wales, especially in the wake of a growing independence movement. A movement that does not understand that “[a] dominated country, or a previously dominated one that does not alter its situation in the international capitalist division of labor, merely reproduces its unfavorable situation: the more it increases the production of the products that its “place” assigns it, the more does it participate in the worsening of its own unfavorable situation”¹⁶ is bound to fail because it will not succeed in achieving its central task: improving the lives of the people who live there.

In the words of Paul Baran (2010), one of the fathers of development theory:

The gap between the actual and the possible is glaring, and its implications are catastrophic. There the difference is between abysmal squalor and decent existence, between the misery of hopelessness and the exhilaration of progress, between life and death of hundreds of millions of people. The establishment of a socialist planned economy is an essential, indeed indispensable, condition for the attainment of economic and social progress in underdeveloped countries.



Endnotes

1. Bowen, 2011
2. Taken from: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/zinoviev/works/x01/x01.htm>
3. Stalin, 1954
4. Stalin, 2013
5. Qtd. in Wolpe, *The Theory of Internal Colonisation: The South African Case*. 1975
6. Michael Hecther, ‘Internal Colonialism.’ 1975
7. Taken from: <https://gov.wales/annual-survey-hours-and-earnings-2019>
8. Williams, 2005
9. Davies, 2007
10. Taken from: <https://wiserd.ac.uk/advantage-welsh-speakers-some-parts-labour-market>
11. MacKenzie, *Irish, Scottish, Welsh and English Worlds? A Four-Nation Approach to the History of the British Empire*. 2008
12. Wallerstein, 2011
13. Chiot and Hall, 1982
14. Wade, 1979
15. Selwyn, 1979
16. Bettelheim, 1979

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